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Abstract 
This study compares the neural substrate of moral decision making processes between Korean 
and American participants. By comparison with Americans, Korean participants showed 
increased activity in the right putamen associated with socio-intuitive processes and right 
superior frontal gyrus associated with cognitive control processes under a moral-personal 
condition, and in the right postcentral sulcus associated with mental calculation in familiar 
contexts under a moral-impersonal condition. On the other hand, American participants showed a 
significantly higher degree of activity in the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) associated 
with conflict resolution under the moral-personal condition, and in the right medial frontal gyrus 
(MFG) associated with simple cognitive branching in non-familiar contexts under the moral-
impersonal condition when a more lenient threshold was applied, than Korean participants. 
These findings support the ideas of the interactions between the cultural background, education, 
and brain development, proposed in the field of cultural psychology and educational psychology. 
The study introduces educational implications relevant to moral psychologists and educators. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, there have been various discussions regarding the relation between culture, education 
and human brain development. Given the previous studies done by cultural neuropsychologists, 
culture and human brain influence and construct each other through continuous interactions [1-3]. 
In addition, educational psychologists have recently argued that education significantly shapes 
human brain, while the brain is also influencing the process of learning [4]. The interactions 
between the cultural background, education, and brain development have become one of the 
most important ideas in the field of cultural neuropsychology and educational psychology. This 
idea proposes that the human brain is not completely determined by genetic factors, and can be 
changed by external cultural and educational factors [1-3]; on the other hand, it suggests that our 
cultural backgrounds and learning processes can also be affected by the results of neural level 
processes [4]. Thus, it may be wise to examine the relations and interactions between these 
factors to have a better understanding of our socio-cultural behaviors. Neuropsychological 
studies of socio-cultural psychological processes and cross-cultural neuropsychological 
investigations will contribute to the development of a better understanding in these fields. Given 
the idea in the field of cultural and educational psychology, we expect that different cultural and 
educational backgrounds across different countries could differently influence the development 
of socio-cognitive psychological processes at the neural level. These cross-cultural differences 
can be investigated through neuroimaging methods, which enable us to monitor socio-cognitive 
processes occurring in the human brain non-invasively. 
Previous neuroimaging studies have attempted to understand cross-cultural differences in socio-
cognitive processes. For instance, the neural substrate of the cultural influence on self-
representation [5], intergroup empathy [6] and delay discounting [7] were investigated using 
neuroimaging methods. However, there have been very few previous human brain studies that 
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have attempted to illuminate the influences of cultural and educational backgrounds on the moral 
decision making mechanism, which constitutes one of the most important parts of human socio-
cognitive psychological processes. Although many scholars in the field of moral and cultural 
psychology have investigated the differences and similarities in moral judgment and moral 
development across different cultures (e.g. [8-14]), their previous studies have not examined the 
differences at the neural level. In addition, previous neuroimaging studies of human morality 
have investigated the neural substrate of moral processes, while controlling for the cultural 
background and ethnicity of participants, and have not focused on cross-cultural differences (e.g. 
[15-19]). 
Therefore, we undertook the present study to compare the neural substrate of the moral decision 
making processes across different cultures, using the functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) method. We presented a series of moral dilemmas to both Korean and American 
participants, and then investigated how their brains were differently activated when they were 
solving the presented moral dilemmas. Finally, we interpreted these neural level findings based 
on the ideas of previous studies in the field of cultural psychology (e.g., [20-26]) and moral 
psychology (e.g., [8-14]). We expect that there would be several significant differences between 
Korean and American’s neural activity when participants are solving moral dilemmas. Given the 
previous studies in the field of cultural psychology, Korean participants are predicted to show a 
more neural activity in brain regions, which are associated with intuition and approximation (e.g., 
putamen, insula, caudate, postcentral sulcus, parietal lobule); on the other hand, Americans are 
predicted to show a significant activity in regions associated with formal reasoning, conflict and 
novelty monitoring (e.g., ACC, frontopolar prefrontal cortex (FPC)).  
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First, this study considers why Korean participants would show a more active response in 
regions associated with intuitive processes, while American counterparts are expected to show an 
increased activity in regions correlated with more slow reasoning processes when they are 
solving moral dilemmas. Norenzayan, Smith, Kim and Nisbett compared decision making 
processes between Korean and American participants [20]. In addition, Nisbett, Peng, Choi and 
Norenzayan suggested that people living in East Asian countries usually “seek intuitive 
instantaneous understanding through direct perception” toward external situations [21]. Because 
people living in East Asian societies tend to perceive and solve problems holistically, they 
become less analytic and think more “big-picture” than Europeans or Americans [21]. This 
tendency also appeared when a previous study tested the difference in critical thinking patterns 
between East Asians and European Canadians; the study showed that East Asians more utilized a 
less exact approximation than European Canadians [22].  
Second, American participants would more utilize the conflict monitoring and novelty detecting 
monitoring mechanisms than Korean participants. The results of previous cultural psychological 
study showed that people living in collectivistic societies prefer to accommodate conflicting 
situations and to follow shared values [23,24], or even to avoid possible social conflicts [25] to 
maintain the harmony in their community, while people who came from individualistic societies 
tend to directly confront the conflicting situations. Moreover, because Korean society is not a 
highly multicultural society, Koreans would not frequently experience severe value conflicts 
between difference socio-cultural values or norms in their everyday life, while Americans would 
be exposed to such conflicts more frequently around them [26].  
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2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Participants 
<Place Table 1 about here> 
Sixteen right-handed adults (aged 21-34 years, mean (±SD) age 28.59 ± 3.18 years; 8 females; 8 
Koreans, 8 Americans) participated in the experiment. The number of each gender in each 
nationality group was equalized (4 males and 4 females in each nationality group). Participants 
in each group were born in their country of citizenship, and had not been out of the land of their 
citizenship more than two years. All participants were recruited in Stanford area. Korean 
participants were staying at Stanford University while we conducted our research. These 
requirements were to control possible confounding effects of different cultural and educational 
environments. They provided a written consent approved by the Institutional Review Board at 
Stanford University, were debriefed, and were compensated for their participation ($60). The 
participants were recruited via Stanford mailing lists and Facebook. For the additional cultural 
perspective survey, these sixteen participants were contacted again, and asked to complete two 
cultural perspective questionnaires about 2-4 weeks after the end of the previous fMRI session. 
We provided them with $2.5 as compensation. One participant did not complete his 
questionnaire, so the survey results from fifteen participants were collected and analyzed. 
2.2. Dilemma Task 
The dilemma set in our study was initially developed by Greene et al [15,16]. It consists of three 
types of dilemmas: moral-personal, moral-impersonal and non-moral (neutral). Moral-personal 
dilemmas involve in certain moral violations, which meet these three criteria: “First, the 
violation must be likely to cause serious bodily harm. Second, this harm must be fall a particular 
person or set of persons. Third, the harm must not result from the deflection of an existing threat 
onto a different party. (p. 389)” [16]. A moral violation is impersonal if it fails to meet these 
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criteria. Non-moral or neutral dilemmas consist of general cognitive problems that were not 
involved in any moral or value judgment, such as a time-scheduling and investment decision. 
The whole dilemma set consisted of a total of 60 dilemmas. There are 22 moral-personal, 18 
moral-impersonal and 20 neutral dilemmas included in the set. We translated them into Korean 
for Korean participants. Two scholars in the field of moral education and moral psychology 
translated and edited the dilemmas. Dilemma texts were presented to participants via a projector 
behind the 3T MR magnet. We used E-Prime 1.2 to display the texts on the projector. The 
participant was able to evaluate whether the solution presented at the end of each dilemma is 
“appropriate” or “inappropriate” using a button box, after reading a presented dilemma.  
Each dilemma was separated into three slides. Participants were able to proceed to the next slide 
by pushing any button on a response box. At the end of the third slide, participants were asked to 
evaluate the presented solution for the dilemma. They were asked to designate the solution as 
“appropriate” or “inappropriate”. Here is an example dilemma presented. At the beginning of 
each trial in the moral-personal condition: 
 
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all remaining civilians. 
You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a large house. Outside you 
hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for valuables. Your baby begins to 
cry loudly. You cover his mouth to block the sound. If you remove your hand from his mouth his 
crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who will kill you， your child， and the others 
hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the others you must smother your child to death. Is 
it appropriate for you to smother your child in order to save yourself and the other townspeople?  
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Here are two other example dilemmas in the moral-impersonal and non-moral conditions: 
 
You are a member of a government legislature. The legislature is deciding between two different 
policies concerning environmental hazards. Policy A has a 90% chance of causing no deaths at 
all and has a 10% chance of causing 1000 deaths. Policy B has a 92% chance of causing no 
deaths and an 8% chance of causing 10,000 deaths. Is it appropriate for you to vote for Policy A 
over Policy B? (Moral-Impersonal) 
 
You are a farm worker driving a turnip-harvesting machine. You are approaching two diverging 
paths. By choosing the path on the left you will harvest ten bushels of turnips. By choosing the 
path on the right you will harvest twenty bushels of turnips. If you do nothing your turnip-
harvesting machine will turn to the left. Is it appropriate for you to turn your turnip-picking 
machine to the right in order to harvest twenty bushels of turnips instead of ten? (Non-Moral) 
 
Participants were asked to evaluate whether the presented solution is morally appropriate or 
inappropriate. On the one hand, if a participant considered that the solution is morally 
appropriate, it usually required a sacrifice of a certain value; for instance, if a participant wanted 
to kill a person to save five other people, she should evaluate the solution as appropriate in that 
case. In most cases, this evaluation was justifiable on utilitarian grounds. On the other hand, if a 
participant designated the solution as morally inappropriate, this response meant that she denied 
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sacrificing the life of the person as a means to save other people. It could be interpreted as a 
deontological decision to the presented moral dilemma. In short, utilitarian judgments represent 
“judgments that maximize aggregate welfare;” whereas deontological judgments are based on a 
philosophical standpoint that contends “certain rights or duties must be respected, regardless of 
the greater good that might otherwise be achieved.” [16] The participant had a total of 46 
seconds to read the presented text and make a decision. 14 seconds of fixations were displayed at 
the beginning and end of each block and between trials. The whole scanning session consisted of 
a total of 12 blocks. Each block contained 5 dilemmas. The order of dilemmas was randomized 
to minimize the possible effect of adaptation to a certain type of dilemma. 
2.3. Cultural Perspective Survey 
To quantify participants’ cultural perspectives, we used two different types of questionnaires. 
First, to measure participants’ perceived tightness-looseness in their country, we used Gelfand et 
al.’s [27] cultural tightness-looseness questionnaire. It consisted of a total of six questions that 
asked a participant’s perceived degree of the tightness or looseness of the cultural and social 
norms in their country with 6-point Likert scale. They were asked to write the numbers that 
represent the degree of their agreement for each statement (e.g., “There are many social norms 
that people are supposed to abide by in your country”, “In your country, if someone acts in an 
inappropriate way, others will strongly disagree”). As a participant’s perceived strength and 
tightness of social norms in her country become stronger, she gets a higher score. In addition, 
Self-Construal Scale developed by Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk and Gelfand was used to measure 
the degree of each participant’s individualistic versus collectivistic self-construal [28]. This 
measurement quantified how strongly a participant regarded himself/herself as an individualist or 
a collectivist with 7-point Likert scale. In common with the tightness-looseness measurement, 
Self-Construal Scale asked participants to rate the degree of agreement to each statement 
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represented either individualism (independent self) (e.g., “I enjoy being unique and different 
from others in many respects”) or collectivism (interdependent self) (e.g., “Even when I strongly 
disagree with group members, I avoid an argument”). We calculated a participant’s “collectivism 
minus individualism score” to quantify her self-construal on her cultural perspective. The higher 
score means that he/she was more likely to perceive himself/herself as a collectivist and 
interdependent person. 
2.4. Image Acquisition 
Participants were scanned with a 3.0 T General Electric whole-body scanner with an 8-channel 
birdcage head coil. Head movements were minimized using foam paddings. High resolution T2-
weighted fast spin echo structural images (TR = 3000ms, TE = 68ms, FOV = 240mm, matrix = 
256 x 256) were acquired for alignment. Thirty-one oblique axial slices were taken parallel to the 
AC-PC with 4-mm slice thickness, 1-mm inter-slice skip. Functional scans were acquired with a 
spiral in and out sequence (TR = 2000ms, TE = 30ms, flip angle = 90
o
) [29]. Thirty-one 4-mm-
thick axial slices were acquired per TR, for a total of 157 TRs per functional block with a 
resolution of 3.75 x 3.75 mm (FOV = 240mm, 64 x 64 matrix) covering the entire brain. An 
automated high-order shimming procedure based on spiral acquisitions was used to reduce B0 
heterogeneity [30]. The total image acquisition time for the functional task was 62-minute and 
48-second long. A high resolution T1 volume scan (132 slices, 1.2-mm thickness) was collected 
for every participant using an IR-prep 3D FSPGR sequence for T1 contrast (TR = 5.8ms, TE = 
1.8ms, flip angle = 11
o
, FOV = 240mm, 256 x 192 x 132 matrix). During the scanning session, 
the participant’s respiration and cardiac pulsatility were measured and recorded using a 
respiratory belt around the abdomen and a pulse oximeter on the finger of the non-dominant 
hand. 
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2.5. Behavioral and Survey Data Analysis 
The response time and decision made by participants were statistically analyzed. First, the mean 
response times under two different conditions (moral-personal versus moral-impersonal) were 
compared using both ANOVA and t-test. The response time was defined as the time period 
between the presentation of the third slide, which asks a participant to make a decision, and the 
button press. These analyses include comparisons between two nationality groups (Korean vs. 
American), gender groups (females vs. males), and response types (appropriate vs. inappropriate). 
In addition, participants’ responses were compared between conditions and groups using both 
within and between-group t-tests. Participants’ responses were coded in two values: 0 
(“appropriate”, utilitarian in most cases) and 1 (“inappropriate”, deontological in most cases). 
First, we compared the mean number of responses between two different moral dilemma 
categories within a group. Because the total number of dilemmas included in each dilemma type 
group was not identical, we used the percentage of “appropriate” responses to control the 
dilemma type factor. Second, these mean numbers were compared between Korean and 
American subjects within each moral dilemma category. Third, we also investigated the gender 
effect on decisions. For these analyses, non-moral dilemmas are excluded because they were 
used for a control condition, and they did not contain any moral proposition or moral implication. 
Instead, we displayed the data of non-moral dilemmas in figures only for demonstration. 
For the survey data analysis, the mean tightness-looseness and Self-Construal Scale scores were 
compared between Korean and American participants using two sample t-tests. In addition, the 
correlation between the calculated tightness-looseness and Self-Construal score, and the neural 
activity of each participant was calculated. This correlational analysis process will be described 
in the next section in detail. 
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2.6. Imaging Analysis 
fMRI data were preprocessed using SPM 8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology) and 
custom MATLAB (Mathworks) routines. To minimize the artifact that might be originated from 
respiratory and cardiac activities, all acquired images were corrected using the RETROICOR 
method [31]. During the preprocessing process, functional data were slice-time corrected, 
realigned within and across blocks to correct for head movement, coregistered with the high-
resolution anatomical scan, normalized into SPM8’s standard MNI space (79 x 95 x 68, 2 x 2 x 2 
mm
3
 voxels), and smoothed with a 8-mm full-width at half maximum Gaussian kernel.  
Regressors for the corresponding condition blocks were modeled as a boxcar function convolved 
with the canonical Hemodynamic Response Function (HRF). The HRF was modeled to include 
eight functional images surrounding the time point of participants’ responses (4-scans before, 1 
during and 3 after). Statistical analysis at the single-subject level treated each voxel according to 
SPM8’s general linear model (GLM). For the second order (group) analysis, normalized images 
were analyzed using ANOVA. In this ANOVA, statistical maps of voxelwise F-statistics were 
thresholded for significance (p < .01 familywise error corrected, cluster size ≥ 12 voxels) and 
cluster size (≥ 12 voxels); however, we applied a more lenient threshold (p < .05, familywise 
error corrected) for exploratory purpose, when we were not able to find statistical significance 
during the course of ANOVA. Then, these images were compared using planned one sample 
(within group analysis) or two sample t-test (between group analysis) according to our 
hypotheses presented in the introduction section. In each t-test, statistical maps of voxelwise t-
statistics were thresholded for significance (p < .001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons) and 
cluster size (≥ 12 voxels); however, we applied a more lenient threshold (p < .005, cluster size ≥ 
12 voxels) for exploratory purpose, when we were not able to find statistical significance. The 
statistical maps were thresholded for minimal cluster size to minimize false positive probability 
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while preventing the loss of statistical power [32]. Among all four comparisons (moral-personal 
– neutral, moral-impersonal – neutral, moral-personal – moral-impersonal, moral-impersonal – 
moral-personal), we focus on two comparisons, moral-personal – neutral and moral-impersonal – 
neutral because these comparisons would show how each group show a greater activity in a brain 
region under a given condition; two other comparisons, moral-personal – moral-impersonal and 
moral-impersonal – moral-personal, are used for exploratory purpose.  
In addition to the whole brain voxelwise cross-cultural t-tests, we conducted correlational 
analyses between each participant’s neural activity, perceived tightness-looseness, and self-
construal scale score. First, we conducted whole brain correlational analyses between 
participants’ brain activity, perceived tightness-looseness, and self-construal scale score with a 
voxelwise significant threshold of p < .01 (r > .62) for exploratory purpose. Then, our planned 
correlational analyses focused on a restricted number of a prior ROI voxels with a reduced 
voxelwise significance threshold of p < .05 (r > .50). These ROIs were decided according to the 
result of the previous whole brain voxelwise cross-cultural t-tests; they were voxels that showed 
a significantly different activity between Korean and American. 
In addition to these procedures for imaging analyses to test our hypotheses, we conducted 
additional analyses to examine the relation between participants’ neural activity, gender, and 
response for exploratory purpose. For the cross-gender analysis, first, we conducted a two-way 
ANOVA (nationality x gender). F-statistics were thresholded for significance (p < .01 
familywise error corrected, cluster size ≥ 12 voxels); however, we applied a more lenient 
threshold (p < .05, familywise error corrected) for exploratory purpose, when we were not able to 
find statistical significance. Then, we compared male and female participants’ neural activity 
with a voxelwise threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons), and minimum 
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cluster size of 12 voxels. We also compared participants’ neural activity between when they 
made an “appropriate” and “inappropriate” decision with a voxelwise threshold of a same p 
value and minimum cluster size. In addition, we calculated correlational coefficients between 
participants’ neural activity and behavioral data. The correlational coefficients between their 
neural activity, response time, and the number of utilitarian or deontological decisions that they 
made were calculated, and a voxelwise significance threshold of p < .01 (r > .62) was applied. 
3. Results 
3.1. Behavioral  
3.1.1. Response Time 
<Place Fig. 1 about here> 
First, we examined the difference in mean response times between two nationality groups. The 
result of ANOVA showed that only the main effect of dilemma type was significant [F (1, 636) = 
9.35, p < .005], while participants’ nationality [F (1, 636) = 2.12, p >> .05] and the interaction 
effect [F (1, 636) = .38, p >> .05] were insignificant. Among Korean participants, there was no 
significant difference in mean response times between moral-personal and moral-impersonal 
conditions [t (318) = 1.64, p >> .05]. However, American responded to moral-personal dilemmas 
significantly slower than to moral-impersonal dilemmas [t (318) = 2.76, p < .01]. In addition, 
there was no effect of nationality on mean response times in both the moral-personal [t (350) 
= .58, p >> .05] and moral-impersonal conditions [t (286) = 1.57, p >> .05]. 
In addition to the nationality, we examined the effects of both gender and response types on 
mean response times. First, in case of the gender effect (see Fig. S1), the result of ANOVA 
showed that both main effects of gender [F (1, 636) = 6.08, p < .05] and dilemma type [F (1, 636) 
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= 9.42, p < .005] were significant, while the interaction effect was insignificant [F (1, 636) = 
0.45, p >> .05]. The results of two group comparisons reported that first, among both females [t 
(318) = 2.36, p < .05] and males [t (318) = 1.97, p < .05], the mean response time under the 
moral-personal condition was significantly greater than that under the moral-impersonal 
condition; second, when we compared by dilemma types, females responded significantly slower 
than males to moral-personal dilemmas [t (350) = 2.16, p < .05], but not to moral-impersonal 
dilemmas [t (286) = 1.36, p >> .05]. 
Second, in case of the effect of response type (appropriate vs. inappropriate) (see Fig. S2), the 
result of ANOVA reported that both main effects of dilemma type [F (1, 636) = 12.5, p < .0005] 
and response type [F (1, 636) = 10.08, p < .005], and the interaction effect were significant [F (1, 
636) = 11.92, p < .001]. However, the mean response time for “appropriate” responses was only 
significantly greater than that for “inappropriate” responses under moral-personal condition [t 
(350) = 4.60, p < .0001], but not under moral-impersonal condition [t (286) = .21, p >> .05]. In 
addition, the significant differences in the mean response time between moral-personal and 
moral-impersonal conditions were only appeared for “appropriate” responses [t (284) = 4.50, p 
< .0001], but not for “inappropriate” responses [t (351) = .07, p >> .05].  
3.1.2. Moral Decision 
<Place Fig. 2 about here> 
First, we examined the effect of nationality on moral decisions. The results of ANOVA reported 
that the main effect of dilemma type [F (1, 28) = .00, p >> .05] and nationality [F (1, 28) = 1.56, 
p >> .05], and the interaction effect (dilemma type by nationality) [F (1, 28) = .46, p >> .05] 
were insignificant.  
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Second, we examine the gender effect on decisions (see Fig. S3). The result of ANOVA 
demonstrated that all effects including the main effects of both dilemma type [F (1, 28) = .00, p 
>> .05] and gender [F (1, 28) = .00, p >> .05], and the interaction effect (dilemma type by 
gender) [F (1, 28) = .38, p >> .05] were insignificant. 
3.2. Survey Data 
<Place Fig. 3 about here> 
We compared the mean tightness-looseness and Self-Construal Scale scores between Korean and 
American participants. First, Korean participants showed a significantly higher mean tightness-
looseness than American participants [t (13) = 3.80, p < .005]. Second, Korean participants 
showed a stronger degree of collectivistic and interdependent self-construal tendency than 
American participants, but the difference was insignificant [t (13) = 0.34, p = .74]. 
3.3. Imaging 
<Place Fig. 4 about here> 
<Place Table 2 about here> 
First, we conducted whole brain voxelwise ANOVAs to identify whether there were significant 
main and interactional effects. There were voxels that showed significant main effects of both 
participants’ group and a dilemma type, and the interaction effect; however, for the interaction 
effect, there was no voxel showed statistical significance for p < .01 (familywise error corrected), 
so we applied a more lenient threshold, p < .05 (familywise error corrected).   
<Place Table 3 about here> 
<Place Fig. 5 about here> 
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<Place Fig. 6 about here> 
We conducted whole brain voxelwise planned t-tests for both Korean and American participants 
to compare the neural activity between moral-personal and neutral conditions, and moral-
impersonal and neutral conditions (see Table S1, S2, and Fig. S4, S5). Next, we conducted two 
sample t-tests to quantify differences in the neural activity between Korean and American using 
the resulted contrast images. First, in the comparison between moral-personal and neutral 
conditions, Korean participants showed a significantly stronger signal increase in the right 
putamen [t (14) = 5.00, p < .0002] and right superior frontal gyrus (SFG) [t (14) = 5.07, p 
< .0002] than American. On the other hand, American’s brain activation was significantly 
stronger in the bilateral ACC than Korean in this comparison [t (14) = -5.38, p < .0001]. In 
addition, we conducted correlational analyses between participants’ neural activity, cultural 
tightness-looseness, and self-construal scores under the moral-personal condition (see Table S3 
and Fig. S6 for the results of whole brain analyses). Given the results of our planned, ROI-
restricted correlational analyses, there were statistically significant correlations between the 
neural activity in these regions and survey results. There were significant positive correlations 
between tightness-looseness scores and percent BOLD signal changes in the right putamen [r (13) 
= .56, p < .05] and right SFG [r (13) = .63, p < .05]. On the other hand, the signal change in the 
bilateral ACC was significantly negatively associated with both tightness-looseness (r (13) = -.55, 
p < .05) and self-construal scores [r (13) = -.41, p < .05]. 
<Place Fig. 7 about here> 
<Place Fig. 8 about here> 
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Second, in the comparison between moral-impersonal and neutral conditions, Korean 
participants showed greater activation in the right postcentral sulcus than American participants 
[t (14) = 5.02, p < .0002]. However, there was no brain region that showed significantly stronger 
activation in American participants than Korean in this comparison. Hence, we applied a more 
lenient threshold (p < .005) for exploratory purpose. When we applied the more lenient threshold, 
only the left MFG showed a significantly stronger activity in American participants than in 
Korean under the moral-impersonal minus neutral condition [t (14) = -3.85, p < .005]. In addition, 
we conducted correlational analyses in the moral-impersonal condition, as we did in the moral-
personal condition (see Table S4 and Fig. S6 for the results of whole brain analyses). Given the 
results of the planned, ROI-restricted analyses, the signal change in the right postcentral sulcus 
was significantly positively associated with participants’ tightness-looseness score [r (13) = .51, 
p < .05]. On the other hand, there were significant negative correlations between the activity in 
the left MFG, and both tightness-looseness [r (13) = -.46, p < .05] and self-construal scores [r 
(13) = -.50, p < .05].  
In addition, for exploratory purpose, we compared the neural activity between Korean and 
American participants for moral-personal minus moral-impersonal, and moral-impersonal minus 
moral-personal conditions. In the comparison between moral-personal and moral-impersonal, 
moral-impersonal and moral-personal conditions, there was a significant difference in the 
bilateral ACC. Korean participants showed a significantly greater activity in their ACC under the 
moral-impersonal condition than under the moral-personal condition [t (14) = 4.14, p < .0005]. 
Meanwhile, American showed a significantly greater activity in their bilateral ACC under the 
moral-personal condition than under the moral-impersonal condition [t (14) = -4.14, p < .0005].  
There were no regions that showed a significantly greater activity among Korean participants 
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under the moral-personal condition than under the moral-impersonal condition; in case of 
American, there were no regions that showed a significantly greater activity under the moral-
impersonal condition than under the moral-personal condition. 
Finally, the regions showed the significant main effects of participants’ nationality and gender, 
and their interaction effect was reported in Table S5 and Fig. S7. In addition, the results of the 
cross-gender comparisons were presented in Table S6 and Fig. S8. Table S7 and Fig. S9 were 
added to demonstrate the differences in the neural activity between when participants made an 
“appropriate” and “inappropriate” decision. In addition, the results of additional correlational 
analyses between each participant’s neural activity, response time, and decisions were presented 
in Table S8, S9, and Fig. S10. We conducted these additional analyses to examine whether the 
findings of previous fMRI investigations conducted with only Americans (see [15,16,33,34]) 
were successfully replicated among our cross-cultural participants. The overall results of our 
analyses successfully replicated the findings of the previous studies [15,16,34]. 
4. Discussion 
First, the behavioral data showed that American participants responded to moral-personal 
dilemmas significantly slower than to moral-impersonal dilemmas, that is, American participants 
needed a longer time when they were solving more complicated and emotion-involved dilemmas. 
This result is in line with a previous cognitive psychology study [20]. Given the previous 
cognitive psychology study, American relied on a slower decision making mechanism based on a 
reasoning process, when they encountered emotionally more complicated dilemmas. Unlike 
American participants, because Korean more utilized intuitive decision making processes, they 
did not respond to more complicated dilemmas slower than to simple dilemmas. On the other 
hand, there were no significant effects of dilemma type and nationality on participants’ responses. 
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The results are in line with the universal moral developmental model proposed by moral 
psychologists; they have argued that moral development and moral judgment are universal across 
different cultures [10-11]. As proposed by them, although the response time and other internal 
decision making processes would differ between American and Korean, the resulted moral 
decisions would not significantly differ from each other. 
There were contradicting results in the analyses of the survey data. First, there was a significant 
difference in the mean tightness-looseness score between Korean and American participants. 
This difference in the cultural tightness-looseness could result from the differences in socio-
cultural backgrounds between Korea and America. Triandis’s [35] and Gelfand et al.’s [27] 
studies suggested that a society with a collectivistic atmosphere and dense population possesses 
strong and tight social and cultural norms. In fact, Korean society that has a collectivistic 
tradition based on Confucianism, dense population, and sparse resource comparing to America, 
possess significantly tighter social and cultural norms; and, Korean participants’ perceived 
degree of cultural tightness is also stronger. However, interestingly, there was no statistically 
significant difference in the Self-Construal Scale score between Korean and American 
participants. It means that Korean participants did not perceive themselves as more independent 
or collectivistic than American participants; it seems to be counterintuitive because various 
previous cultural psychological studies reported that people living East Asian countries are more 
interdependent than American (e.g. [36,37]). There could be two reasons. First, we recruited 
Korean participants at Stanford University, so they could be more individualistic than people 
living in Korea. Second, we must consider the difference in the nature of questions between 
tightness-looseness and Self-Construal Scale questionnaires. The former aims to measure the 
perceived tightness of socio-cultural norms, while the latter asking whether a participant regards 
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herself as either an independent or interdependent person.  Thus, there could be a larger 
individual variance in the result of Self-Construal Scale than the tightness-looseness score; it 
could be resulted in the small difference in its mean score between two groups. In fact, in Chiao 
et al.’s [2], there were more Japanese participants placed in the individualistic group than 
American participants (7 Japanese versus 3 Americans).  
There were significant differences in neural activation in some brain regions between Korean 
and American participants when they were solving moral dilemmas. Although the resulted moral 
decisions were similar between groups, the internal, neural level mechanism of decision making 
processes showed differences. The overall results of ANOVAs were in line with our prediction 
and previous studies. We predicted that Korean participants would show more enhanced activity 
in brain regions associated with intuitive and approximation processes, while their American 
counterparts would show stronger activity in the regions associated with reasoning and cognitive 
processes. In fact, a significant main effect of the group factor was found in the insula, putamen, 
postcentral sulcus, ACC, and SFG, which are associated with either intuitive, approximation, or 
reasoning process [38-48]. The result of the ANOVA of the main effect of the dilemma type also 
successfully replicated the previous fMRI investigation of moral functioning conducted by 
Greene et al. [15]. As Greene et al. reported, participants’ brain regions including the MFG, 
angular gyrus, and parietal lobe showed the significant main effect of the dilemma type in our 
experiment. In addition, our additional ANOVA with a more lenient threshold reported that a 
significant interaction effect was found in the ACC, which is also regarded to be associated with 
a conflict monitoring and cognitive process that are likely to be influenced by both participants’ 
group and dilemma type [43-45]. Given these results, we found that there would be the 
meaningful effects of both the nationality group and dilemma type on participants’ neural 
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activity, so we proceeded to conduct our planned t-tests to examine the differences in the neural 
activity under a given dilemma condition between Korean and American participants. In addition 
to the results of ANOVA, the results of within-group comparisons are also in line with the results 
shown in Greene et al.’s [15,16] previous studies. 
First, under the moral-personal condition, Korean participants showed significantly stronger 
neural activation in the right putamen and right SFG that corresponds to the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Given previous studies of the cognitive functional role of the 
putamen, the activity in this area is significantly associated with intuitive social decision making 
and behavioral processes [38,39]. In addition, a previous study suggested that the putamen is 
associated with automatic emotional responses and processes, in particular, negative emotions, 
such as hate and disgust [49]. Thus, Korean participants apparently utilized socio-moral intuitive 
processes more strongly, and they more relied on an emotional intuitive circuit, which is 
associated with hate and disgust emotions when they were solving complicated and emotionally 
negative moral dilemmas, as suggested by the increased activity in the putamen. This result is in 
line with previous studies in the field of cultural psychology [21].  
A previous fMRI investigation on socio-moral decision making tasks showed that the 
involvement of the putamen is significantly associated with the pursuit of efficiency or utilitarian 
value [50]. However, there was no statistically significant between-group difference in the 
number of solutions for moral dilemmas that were perceived morally appropriate (in most cases, 
associated with utilitarianism) by participants in the moral-personal condition. If the activity in 
the putamen that facilitates an intuitive and utilitarian decision making mechanism was not 
controlled, then Korean participants should have made more utilitarian responses than American 
counterparts. The present study supposes that the significantly greater activity in the right 
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DLPFC among Korean participants is associated with an increased cognitive control over the 
intuitive activity in the right putamen that is associated with a utilitarian decision. Previous 
studies showed that the DLPFC is associated with cognitive control over initial intuitive 
responses and behaviors [16,48]. Thus, the activity in the DLPFC could control the initial 
intuitive responses of the putamen that is significantly associated with utilitarian decisions, and 
finally, Korean participants could show a similar response pattern with American participants 
under the moral-personal condition. This involvement of the DLPFC into the process of moral 
decision making among Korean participants can be explained by their cultural background. 
Social and cultural norms in East Asian society that more value the community values than 
individual desires influence people to more strongly suppress and control their individual, 
immediate desires and opinions [51]. In addition, Confucian tradition in Korean society teaches 
that people should control their emotions and feelings [52]. As a result of this cultural experience 
of Korean, they showed increased activity in the DLPFC region, which is correlated with a 
cognitive control over their initial emotional intuitive responses toward emotionally complicated 
moral-personal dilemmas.  
This co-activation of both the putamen and DLPFC would seem to be logically inconsistent 
because the putamen is associated with intuition, while the DLPFC is involved in cognitive 
control. This situation can be explained by the nature of moral problems, which is different from 
usual problem sets that were used in the previous study that demonstrated the intuitive nature of 
Asians (e.g., [20]). The problems that were used in this study were basically mathematical, rather 
than morality-related; they qualitatively differ from those used in our study. In fact, as Turiel 
proposed, those two problems are in different domains, and they cause significantly different 
psychological responses in participants [53]. Morality-involved problems are more associated to 
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emotional aspects that are common across diverse cultures comparing to arithmetic problems, 
which are relatively free from emotions [54,55]. In addition, as proposed in the introduction, 
several moral psychologists showed evidence of the universality of human morality and moral 
development across diverse cultures, including both American and Korean [10,11]. As a result, 
although Koreans are inclined to activate intuition when they encountered moral dilemmas, as 
previous cross-cultural cognition studies showed, due to the universality underlies human 
morality and moral problems, they finally made decisions that did not differ from America’s’ 
decisions, as presented in our behavioral data. In this process, Koreans attempt to control their 
immediate, affective response as influenced by their cultural and educational background (e.g., 
[51,52]), and as revealed in the activity in the DLPFC. In addition, because the increase of the 
response time is directly associated with the activity in the ACC, not DLPFC [56], Korean 
participants show a significantly shorter mean response time than Americans, though they more 
activated cognitive control processes associated with the DLPFC. 
On the other hand, American participants showed stronger activity in the ACC under the moral-
personal condition. Previous studies of the cognitive role of the ACC showed that the activation 
in this region is closely associated with conflict-monitoring activities [43,44] and emotional 
conflict solving [45]. Given these previous studies, American participants could utilize conflict 
monitoring and resolving mechanisms more when they were coping with emotional and 
complicated moral dilemmas, and it may be correlated with the stronger activity in the ACC. 
Because Korean participants have grown up in a collectivistic society that emphasizes the 
harmony among people living in a same society or community, they might have few chances to 
utilize this conflict managing mechanisms in their life [26]. This result is also in line with our 
behavioral-level result that showed that American participants spent significantly longer time to 
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solve moral-personal dilemmas than moral-impersonal dilemmas, while this difference did not 
appear among Korean participants. The involvement of the ACC during the decision making 
process to solve emotionally complicated moral dilemmas is associated with a slower processing 
speed, because its conflict monitoring process requires a longer time when it deals with high-
conflict problems [46].  
Under the moral-impersonal condition, Korean participants showed a significantly increased 
neural activity in their postcentral sulcus. Previous studies investigating this region showed that 
the activity in this region is strongly associated with comparison and approximation, rather than 
accurate and exact calculation [40,41]. Given the findings of the present study and previous 
studies, Korean participants utilized more approximation and comparison and less exact 
calculation processes when they were solving moral-impersonal dilemmas, which do not 
intensively arouse emotional responses and are not seriously involved in harm to a human. This 
behavior is also in line with cultural psychological studies that have shown the cultural 
difference in the reasoning and approximation mechanisms between East Asian and Western 
societies [21,22].  
On the other hand, there was no brain region in American participants that showed a significantly 
greater activity than Korean participants under the moral-impersonal condition at p < .001. 
However, we attempted to apply a more lenient threshold (p < .005) for exploratory purpose. Of 
course, because we increased the threshold p value, there is a higher possibility of false positive 
in this analysis, and it reduces the credibility of the result. Thus, the result of this analysis with 
the more lenient threshold should be exploratory, not confirmatory. The result demonstrated that 
a part of the MFG, which corresponds to the FPC, showed a substantially stronger activity 
among American participants. Koechlin and Hyafil proposed that the involvement of the FPC is 
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associated with “the processing of simple cognitive branching,” particularly under uncertain 
situations, but it has a limited capacity, and is related to non-expert cognitive skills [47]. This 
result could be explained by the national-wide ethics and moral education curriculum in Korea. 
Korean moral education curriculum provides materials for the development of moral reasoning, 
and chances to practice moral judgment through various activities including lectures and 
discussions. All Korean participants in the present study were required to take this ethics and 
moral education subject at least for ten years, from elementary to high school [57]. As a result, 
they were able to practice their moral decision making skills through the curriculum, and became 
more familiar with moral problem solving, and showed less activity in the FPC region. Korean 
participants showed increased activity in a part of the inferior parietal cortex, postcentral sulcus 
and inferior parietal lobule that was proved to be associated with trained mental arithmetic 
abilities [42]. However, this difference did not appear under moral-personal condition. Because 
ethics and moral education materials in Korea do not include any significantly violent or brutal 
moral dilemmas similar to the dilemmas used under moral-personal condition that might not be 
appropriate to children and adolescents [57], and they usually utilize formalized and exemplary 
socio-moral stories, so Korean participants could show skilled moral decision making abilities 
only with the moral-impersonal dilemmas, which are similar to what they have been exposed to 
during ethics and moral education classes.  
The correlational analyses between participants’ neural activity, tightness-looseness, and 
perceived self-construal scores were also conducted. In case of the tightness-looseness score, the 
results were similar to what we expected. The differences in the socio-cultural environment 
between Korean and American societies (e.g., [23-25,27,36,37]) would be properly reflected into 
the calculated correlations between the tightness-looseness score and neural activity in selected 
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brain regions as presented in Fig. 6 and 8. However, in case of the correlation between 
participants’ neural activity and self-construal score, there were some inconsistent results. 
Although there was no significant difference in the mean self-construal score between Korean 
and American participants, significant correlations between the neural activity and the score was 
discovered in some brain regions that showed significant cross-cultural differences. It can be 
interpreted by the influence of participants’ self-construal on their decisions and behaviors at 
both individual and group levels. In fact, Eby and Dobbins’s [58] study showed that the 
perceived individualistic-collectivistic orientation at both levels significantly influence people’s 
behavior. Although the orientation at one level could be independent from that at another level, 
both factors simultaneously shape people’s thought and behavior in a same direction. Likewise, 
our participants’ perceived self-construal—that is an individual-level factor—could be 
independent from the group-level factor—that is, perceived cultural tightness-looseness, but it 
could significantly contribute to the difference in neural activity as the group-level factor in a 
same direction. In fact, the arguments of previous cross-cultural psychological studies regarding 
people’s individualistic-collectivistic orientation, thought, and behavior (e.g., [23-25,35-37]) 
correspond to the significant correlations between participants’ self-construal score and neural 
activity in their ACC associated with conflict-monitoring and deliberation, and FPC associated 
with the deliberative processing of unfamiliar problem solving. 
In addition to these main findings, we conducted additional analyses on the effects of gender and 
response type factors at the both behavioral and neural level. The correlation between behavioral 
and image data were also analyzed to examine whether the present study is consistent with 
previous studies. First, we examined the effect of gender factor on the mean response time, 
decision outcome, and neural activity. There was a significant gender effect on these behavioral 
30 
and neuroimaging data, excepting the mean decision outcome; in addition, a significant 
interaction effect of participants’ nationality by gender was also discovered using ANOVA (See 
Table. S5, S6, Fig. S1, S3, S7, S8). The cross-gender similarity in decision outcomes are in line 
with previous moral psychological studies that showed a universal developmental model of 
morality (e.g., [10]). However, future studies should be conducted to explain the cross-gender 
differences in the mean response time and brain activity during moral tasks. 
Second, in case of the response type, “appropriate (utilitarian)” responses showed a significantly 
longer mean response time than “inappropriate (deontological)” responses under the moral-
personal condition, but not under the moral-impersonal condition. This result is in line with 
previous fMRI investigations conducted by Greene et al. [15-16] (see Fig. S2). The differences 
in participants’ neural activity when they responded “appropriate” and “inappropriate” to a given 
dilemma are also in line with Greene et al.’s findings [15-16] (see Fig. S9). They demonstrated 
that when a participant made a utilitarian (appropriate) decision, his/her bilateral DLPFC was 
significantly activated particularity under the moral-personal condition. It would correspond to 
the previous study that showed the involvement of the process of cognitive control, when a 
person made a utilitarian decision that overridden his/her initial gut-level, immediate emotional 
response that might lead to a deontological decision [33,34]. In conclusion, the findings of 
previous studies, which only investigated American, were successfully replicated with our cross-
cultural sample. 
The results of additional correlational analyses between participants’ neural activity, response 
time and the number of “appropriate” versus “inappropriate” decisions made by them would also 
replicate previous studies. First, we demonstrated that in both conditions, the engagement of the 
ACC was significantly associated with the increase of the response time. This result is in line 
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with the previous study of the role of the ACC [46] and the neural correlate of moral reasoning 
[34]. Because the ACC is associated with conflict monitoring, conflict solving, and “classical 
cognitive” processes [46], which constitute a moral reasoning mechanism [34], the activity in 
this region would be positively associated with the response time to a given dilemma. In our 
study, brain regions other than the ACC, such as the fusiform gyrus, were negatively associated 
with the response time. This negative correlation is also in line with a Volz and von Cramon’s 
[59] neuroimaging study that showed that the activity in the fusiform gyrus was significantly 
greater in the intuitive judgment condition comparing to the non-intuitive judgment condition.  
Second, under both conditions, as participant made more utilitarian decisions, their neural 
activity in regions associated with a cognitive control, in particular, the DLPFC significantly 
increased. On the other hand, the number of deontological decisions was positively correlated 
with the neural activity in other regions, such as the amygdala and limbic system that are 
associated with affective and emotional processes (see [33,34]). These differences in the neural 
activity between utilitarian and deontological decisions were more prominent under the moral-
personal condition than the moral-impersonal condition. Because of the nature of each dilemma 
type, the involvement of either utilitarian or deontological neural mechanism would be stronger 
in the moral-personal condition (see [15,16]). These results replicated previous neuroimaging 
investigations on the differences between utilitarian and deontological decisions [33,34].  
However, we point out that there is a significant limitation in our study. Due to its small sample 
size for each group, the volume of each cluster that showed significantly different BOLD 
activation between Korean and American participants was small; the largest cluster was smaller 
than 65 voxels (520 mm
3
). Because of the relatively modest sample size, we conducted a post-
hoc statistical power analysis based on between-group difference in BOLD signal strengths, 
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inter-subject variability and sample size for each group (8 subjects) at a threshold p-value = 
0.001 (see [60]). The analysis utilized data from brain regions that showed significantly different 
activity between Korean and American subjects. The results showed that excepting the MFG, 
which did not show significantly different activity at the initial threshold p = .001, all regions 
showed statistical power stronger than 80%. In case of the MFG, the power was 71%; although 
this value is slightly less than the typically accepted value of 80%, it can be deemed an 
acceptable power [61,62]. Of course, the larger sample size would be helpful to increase the 
generalizability and statistical power in general [63], but our results based on the sample size are 
at least acceptable by established norms. To support the main findings of our study, future 
studies should be conducted to address this problem. A larger sample size would increase the 
overall statistical power of the comparisons, minimize the possibility of potential type II error, 
and increase the size of each cluster that shows a significant difference between two groups [63]. 
In addition, there have been several concerns regarding the moral dilemmas developed by 
Greene and his colleagues. Among them, Christensen and Gomila pointed out two significant 
problems. First, the classification between three dilemma types (moral-personal, moral-
impersonal, and non-moral) are not fully elaborated; instead, the classification of Greene et al. 
was preliminary, not final [64]. Second, there is significant within-type variability. For instance, 
a perceived personal distance [64] in a certain dilemma could significantly differ from another 
dilemma of the same type, and it could increase within-type variability. Finally, some moral 
psychologists have contended that because these dilemmas are not realistic, but hypothetical, and 
contain extreme situations it would be difficult to properly investigate participants’ moral 
thinking in their real, everyday lives using them (e.g., [65]). However, to examine cross-cultural 
differences and similarities by comparing the findings of the present study with those of previous 
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studies that only targeted American, the present study utilized the dilemmas used in previous 
studies. Thus, future studies should use improved moral dilemmas. First, philosophical 
sophistication is needed to address unclear dilemma classification and within-type variability 
problems (e.g., [66]). Second, more realistic everyday moral dilemmas, such as the dilemmas 
used in Gilligan’s moral decision making study (see [67]), should be utilized. 
5. Conclusions 
In conclusion, the differences in cultural and educational backgrounds between the two 
participant groups may be associated with the differences in the pattern of moral decision making 
processes at the neural level. We compared moral decision making processes at both behavioral 
and neural levels between Korean and American participants. The findings of the present study 
support the standpoint in cultural psychology that argues culture-brain co-construction [1,2], and 
in educational psychology that emphasizes the influences of education to human brain 
development [4] even in the domain of morality. Socio-cultural and educational factors related to 
morality are strongly associated with the human brain development, so the difference in these 
factors could lead to different neural developmental mechanisms. Finally, the differences in the 
neural developmental courses could be investigated using neuroimaging methods, and could be 
reflected in the differences in the neural activity during moral decision making tasks as reported 
in the present study.  
As a result, we propose some implications for moral development and education that could be 
drawn from the findings of the present study. In previous moral psychological and educational 
studies, scholars have utilized self-reporting paper-and-pencil, or interview-based measurement 
to investigate participants’ moral decision making processes (e.g. Moral Judgment Interview [68], 
Defining Issues Test [69]). However, this kind of subjective measurement can be susceptible to 
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the deception problem, and cannot show us the underlying mechanism of human moral 
functioning (see [70]). Thus, this neuroimaging study contributes to the illumination of 
mechanisms and processes of moral decision making. It is important to properly measure the 
degree of students’ moral development to evaluate the effects of moral educational programs, so 
this kind of more reliable and valid measurement can give moral educators with more accurate 
information about how their programs influence on students’ moral functioning and which part 
of the programs should be improved and modified. Given the fact that Korean society is quickly 
transforming into a multicultural society, this kind of cross-cultural neuroscientific investigation 
of moral decision making processes may provide moral psychologists and educators with useful 
inspirations about how to teach Korean students how cope with moral problems occurring in 
Korean society. Because there is a large possibility that more diverse and severe values conflicts 
will happen in pluralist, multicultural societies, these functions—value conflict detection, 
monitoring, and solving—are very crucial to solve various moral problems in multicultural 
societies where various social, cultural, and moral values originated from different cultures 
coexist. However, the result of this study demonstrated that Korean participants showed weaker 
brain activation in the ACC that is associated with the value conflict detection and solving than 
American participants. Given the result of this study, on the one hand, Korean participants 
seemed to be less inclined to utilize these functions than American participants when they were 
solving human value-involved moral dilemmas. Thus, to be prepared for the trend of 
multiculturalization in Korean and other unicultural and collectivistic society in a transition 
period, moral psychologists and educators should consider how to improve these functions that 
seem to be less activated in Korean participants, but are essential to solve moral problems in a 
multicultural society. In addition, some moral-personal dilemmas could be frequently utilized to 
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promote the development of students’ moral deliberation and thinking on the dignity of human 
life. On the other hand, in American schools where moral education is not provided to student as 
a form of an individual subject, opportunities for moral discussions and debates regarding 
various moral issues and dilemmas through all subjects and extracurricular activities should be 
provided to students. Given the results of the analysis of participants’ brain activation, by 
enhancing access to moral discussions in American schools American students could be 
familiarized to socio-moral issues as Korean students. In conclusion, moral education should be 
culturally sensitive to effectively promote students’ moral development.  
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Tables 
No Nationality Gender Degree or Major Involved in moral studies? 
1 Korean Female MA in Education Y 
2 Korean Female BS in Science N 
3 Korean Female BA in Music N 
4 Korean Female BS in Engineering N 
5 Korean Male MS in Science Y 
6 Korean Male MS in Engineering N 
7 Korean Male MD N 
8 Korean Male MS in Science N 
9 American Female 
College student in 
Engineering N 
10 American Female BA in Psychology Y 
11 American Female BA in Psychology N 
12 American Female BS in Psychology N 
13 American Male Law school student Y 
14 American Male MA in Education N 
15 American Male MA in Education N 
16 American Male BS in Psychology N 
Table 1. Participant demographic information 
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Condition/Region x y z Vox F 
Main Effects 
     Group (Korean vs. American) 
     R Inferior Parietal Lobule 54 -28 30 273 17.28 
R Precentral G 60 8 18 201 24.08 
R Insula, Putamen 34 4 6 124 15.7 
R Postcentral S -58 -60 38 122 19.37 
L Medial Frontal G, ACC -6 58 2 100 16.82 
R Hypothalamus 0 -8 -10 96 18.24 
R Superior Frontal G 12 56 36 87 31.77 
L Medial Frontal G -6 -16 58 57 16.57 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 42 -42 46 51 14.24 
R Middle Temporal G 54 -72 10 44 16.07 
L Precentral G -56 2 10 25 13.82 
L Fusiform G -32 -34 -24 15 12.18 
      Dilemma Type (Moral-Personal vs. Moral-Impersonal) 
  Bi Medial Frontal G, ACC -8 54 12 1262 48.35 
R Superior Parietal Lobule 30 -56 36 981 30.46 
L Superior Parietal Lobule -26 -66 46 238 17.35 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule -38 -40 46 53 13.98 
R Middle Temporal G 56 -50 -14 45 17.24 
R Inferior Frontal G 50 10 24 38 13.59 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 -34 42 26 13.23 
      Interaction Effect 
     Group X Dilemma Type 
     Bi Anterior Cingulate Cortex -2 46 6 99 10.8* 
R Inferior Frontal G 52 6 22 15 8.47* 
Table 2. Results of whole-brain ANOVA for the main effects of participants’ group and dilemma 
type, and interaction effect , p < .01 familywise error corrected, k ≥ 12. MNI coordinates. (* : p 
< .05 familywise error corrected, k ≥ 12) 
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Condition/Region x y z Cluster size (vox.) t 
Korean > American      
Moral-Personal minus Neutral      
R Putamen 30 -16 6 32 5 
R Superior Frontal G 12 54 36 14 5.07 
Moral-Impersonal minus Neutral      
R Postcentral S 56 -24 38 21 5.02 
Moral-Impersonal minus Moral-Personal    
Bi ACC 2 44 10 34 4.14 
      
American > Korean      
Moral-Personal minus Neutral      
Bi ACC -2 46 8 64 -5.38 
Moral-Impersonal minus Neutral      
L Medial Frontal G
*
 -6 58 4 63 -3.85 
Moral-Personal minus Moral-Impersonal     
Bi ACC 2 44 10 34 -4.14 
Table 3. Results of whole-brain contrast for (moral-personal – neutral), (moral-impersonal – 
neutral), (moral-personal – moral-impersonal), and (moral-impersonal – moral-personal) 
between Korean and American participants, p < .001, k ≥ 12. MNI coordinates. (* : p < .005, k ≥ 
12) 
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1. Results of the comparison of the mean response time between Korean and American 
participants under three conditions. American participants spent a significantly longer time to 
solve moral-personal dilemmas than moral-impersonal dilemmas. There was no significant 
difference among Korean participants. 
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Fig. 2. Results of the comparison of the mean percentages of dilemma solutions that were 
considered morally appropriate by participants between two groups.  
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Fig. 3. Results of the comparison of the mean tightness-looseness and Self-Construal Scale 
scores between Korean and American participants. Korean participants reported higher mean 
scores in both scales, but only the difference in the mean tightness-looseness score was 
significant. 
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Fig. 4. Results of whole-brain ANOVA for the main effects of nationality group and dilemma 
type (p < .01 (familywise error corrected), k ≥ 12), and the interactional effect of (nationality 
group x dilemma type) (p < .05 (familywise error corrected), k ≥ 12). 
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Fig. 5. Results of whole-brain contrast between Korean and American participants for (moral-
personal – neutral) condition, p < .001, k ≥ 12. Korean participants showed a significantly 
stronger activation in their right putamen and right superior frontal gyrus than American 
participants. American participants showed a significantly stronger activity in their bilateral 
anterior cingulate cortex than Korean participants. 
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Fig. 6. Results of the correlational analyses between BOLD signal change in each region, 
tightness-looseness and self-construal scores under the moral-personal condition. There were 
significant positive correlations between the tightness-looseness score, the signal changes in the 
right putamen and right superior frontal gyrus. On the other hand, there were significant negative 
correlations between the signal change in the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex and both scores. 
A threshold of p < .05 was applied. Gray dots represent Koreans, and black dots represent 
Americans. 
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Fig. 7. Results of whole-brain contrast between Korean and American participants for (moral-
impersonal – neutral) condition, p < .001, k ≥ 12. Korean participants showed significantly 
greater activation in their postcentral sulcus. When applied a more lenient threshold (p < .005), 
American participants showed a stronger activity in their left medial frontal gyrus than Korean 
participants. 
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Fig. 8. Results of the correlational analyses between BOLD signal change in each region, 
tightness-looseness and self-construal scores under the moral-impersonal condition. There was a 
significant positive correlation between the signal change in the right postcentral sulcus and the 
cultural tightness score. On the other hand, there were significant negative correlations between 
the signal change in the left medial frontal gyrus and both scores. A threshold of p < .05 was 
applied. Gray dots represent Koreans, and black dots represent Americans. 
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Supplementary Materials 
Tables 
Condition/Region x y z Cluster size (vox.) t 
Moral-Personal minus Neutral 
     Bi ACC 8 42 8 1933 20.6 
L Precuneus 0 -38 16 734 21.3 
R STG 66 -40 13 101 7.39 
L Hippocampus -34 14 -4 89 9.78 
L Insula -28 12 -10 75 8.09 
R STS 48 -60 10 73 7.5 
R Hippocampus 30 -8 -20 44 11.6 
L Occipital Lobe -52 -70 12 44 6.96 
L Postcentral G -30 -44 70 42 9.11 
L OFC -20 34 -8 27 6.26 
R Caudate 16 16 14 25 6.16 
L MTG -40 -60 14 19 6.66 
L Medial Frontal G -6 -14 62 19 5.7 
Bi Subcallosal G 0 6 -16 18 8.26 
L Caudate Head -12 20 -6 17 5.53 
R STG 36 12 -34 14 5.39 
L ACC -2 16 -8 14 5.25 
R Middle Frontal G 28 28 34 13 7.82 
      Moral-Impersonal minus Neutral 
    L Precuneus -12 -32 40 310 8.19 
L Precuneus -2 -66 32 111 6.44 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule -68 -26 22 80 7.51 
R Postcentral G 54 -24 40 49 8.97 
Bi Superior Frontal G 4 52 32 49 7.5 
R Middle Frontal G 22 32 38 37 10.1 
R Supramarginal G 56 -26 26 28 5.39 
L Medial Frontal G -6 52 12 18 6.82 
R STG 68 -42 18 15 5.66 
L Caudate Head -12 20 -8 14 6.11 
      Moral-Personal minus Moral-Impersonal 
   Bi Medial Frontal G 8 56 10 481 10.3 
R TPJ 60 -66 22 30 6.69 
L Superior Frontal G -12 68 8 16 7.29 
Bi Precuneus 2 -62 32 16 5.63 
      Moral-Impersonal minus Moral-Personal 
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R Inferior Parietal Lobule 50 -40 46 98 7.59 
R MTG 60 -48 -16 73 9.72 
L Inferior Frontal G -58 12 28 60 8.67 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 42 -58 52 51 5.99 
R Inferior Frontal G 50 16 28 45 8.06 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule -38 -52 50 43 5.83 
L Middle Frontal G -42 12 32 35 5.8 
Table S1. Results of whole-brain contrast for (moral-personal – neutral), (moral-impersonal – neutral), 
(moral-personal – moral-impersonal) and (moral-impersonal – moral-personal) conditions within Korean 
participants, p < .001, k ≥ 12. MNI coordinates. 
 
 
  
57 
Condition/Region x y z Cluster size (vox.) t 
Moral-Personal minus Neutral 
     Bi ACC -8 38 10 3769 18.8 
Bi Precuneus -4 58 18 386 10.3 
L Cingulate G -16 -34 36 189 12.8 
L TPJ -48 -82 24 146 9.42 
L Parahippocampa G -30 -44 -4 133 14 
R Subcallosal G 6 4 -18 87 9.86 
R Cingulate G 12 -32 42 86 6.81 
L Insula -36 20 -12 41 8.97 
R TPJ 58 -62 6 22 5.43 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule -68 -36 30 17 5.59 
Bi OFC -2 30 -14 15 5.91 
      Moral-Impersonal minus Neutral 
    L Medial Frontal G -8 60 10 221 10.4 
L Parahippocampa G -22 -38 -32 184 7.76 
L Superior Frontal G -30 28 36 170 8.28 
Bi Precuneus -6 -54 16 134 7.08 
L Cingulate G -16 -34 32 132 8.09 
L TPJ -50 -76 16 125 9.43 
R Precuneus 8 -44 46 64 8.06 
Bi ACC -2 34 24 46 9.95 
R MTG 56 -62 -10 33 8.89 
L Middle Frontal G -20 -12 62 28 5.57 
R Thalamus 16 -28 6 22 8.24 
L Superior Frontal G -20 60 16 21 7.06 
R Superior Frontal G 30 34 36 17 6 
R TPJ 56 -62 8 16 5.57 
R Fusiform G 30 -36 -24 14 6.08 
L Precuneus -4 -52 42 14 5.39 
      Moral-Personal minus Moral-Impersonal 
   Bi ACC -10 38 8 1328 12.6 
Bi Precuneus -4 -56 22 417 21.6 
R Parahippocampa G 18 4 -18 175 14 
L Insula -30 12 -16 94 6.96 
R Superior Frontal G 20 46 46 73 9.09 
L Cingulate G -18 -22 38 26 8.57 
      Moral-Impersonal minus Moral-Personal 
   R Precuneus 30 -44 34 734 10.1 
L Superior Parietal Lobule -28 60 42 76 6.01 
58 
L Fusiform G 34 -66 -16 51 7.08 
L Inferior Frontal G -40 4 34 45 6.18 
L Inferior Frontal G -56 30 18 27 10.9 
L Precuneus -18 -76 52 15 5.67 
L Precuneus -16 -62 42 14 5.54 
R Caudate 16 -8 18 12 5.91 
Table S2. Results of whole-brain contrast for (moral-personal – neutral), (moral-impersonal – neutral), 
(moral-personal – moral-impersonal) and (moral-impersonal – moral-personal) conditions within 
American participants, p < .001, k ≥ 12. MNI coordinates.  
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Condition/Region x y z Vox p 
Moral-Personal & Tightness 
     Positive Correlation 
     R Superior Frontal G 10 54 36 696 .0002 
L Putamen -14 6 -8 417 .0008 
R Hippocampus 42 -16 -16 143 .0002 
R Precentral G 48 0 38 97 .0003 
R Cingulate G 18 -46 26 48 .0006 
R Middle Temporal G 54 -72 12 47 .005 
L Posterior Cingulate Cortex -26 -64 4 41 .005 
L Inferior Frontal G -42 24 6 40 .002 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule -58 -60 38 37 .001 
L Middle Frontal G -18 10 66 37 .007 
L Precuneus -20 -52 42 35 .002 
R Anterior Cigulate Cortex 6 22 -4 32 .01 
L Inferior Frontal G -42 14 14 30 .009 
L Inferior Frontal G -44 32 -10 25 .007 
R Putamen 30 -12 4 22 .005 
R Lentiform Nucleus 16 -8 2 22 .005 
L Cingulate G -20 -20 46 20 .003 
R Meiddle Temporal G 42 10 -34 20 .009 
L Middle Frontal G -42 42 24 14 .009 
      Negative Correlation 
     Bi Anterior Cingulate Cortex -4 46 2 13 .008 
L Superior Temporal G -50 -32 8 23 .003 
R Inferior Frontal G 50 10 30 21 .003 
R Middle Frontal G 36 -2 54 13 .01 
      Moral-Personal & INT - IND 
     Positive Correlation (Interdependent) 
     R Cingulate G 16 -18 54 797 .0001 
L Cingulate G -12 12 40 459 .0004 
R Insula 42 12 -2 249 .002 
R Postcentral G 66 -20 34 210 .001 
R Middle Frontal G 48 44 24 202 .001 
L Insula -44 12 2 198 .002 
R Inferior Frontal G 46 52 8 140 .0002 
L Precuneus -16 -54 64 110 .001 
L Insula -30 4 18 71 .002 
R Insula 38 -6 -10 46 .003 
L Middle Occipital G -34 -76 6 41 .003 
L Anterior Cingulate Cortex -12 26 26 35 .005 
60 
L Insula -40 -2 -12 29 .003 
R Medial Frontal G 14 4 64 26 .006 
R Putamen 30 -22 -4 17 .005 
L Insula -34 10 -14 15 .007 
R Medial Frontal G 18 8 50 13 .006 
      Negative Correlation (Individualistic) 
     L Middle Temporal G -60 -20 -18 42 .004 
R Middle Temporal G 62 -32 -16 48 .001 
L Middle Frontal G -38 38 -4 15 .006 
L Anterior Cingulate Cortex -6 26 -2 12 .01 
Bi Anterior Cingulate Cortex -4 26 10 35 .005 
L Superior Frontal G -14 58 24 21 .007 
R Superior Temporal G 60 -64 26 16 .002 
L Precuneus -4 -66 28 28 .01 
L Angular G -30 -62 32 27 .008 
Table S3. Results of whole-brain correlational analyses between neural activity, cultural tightness, and 
self-construal score for (moral-personal – neutral), p < .01, k ≥ 12. MNI coordinates. 
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Condition/Region x y z Vox p 
Moral-Impersonal & Tightness 
     Positive Correlation 
     L Putamen -14 6 -8 417 .001 
R Insula 30 -30 16 193 .002 
Bi Superior Frontal G 2 62 32 179 .001 
R Hippocampus 38 -24 -12 152 .0008 
R Cingulate G 8 4 34 131 .0002 
L Cingulate G -18 -22 44 110 .007 
L Parahippocampa G -32 -52 -12 107 .003 
R Precentral G 36 -10 30 106 .005 
R Caudate 16 8 22 101 .003 
R Postcentral S 50 -16 22 96 .004 
L Insula -32 10 0 95 .0009 
R Putamen 30 6 6 93 .005 
R Inferior Frontal G 64 8 16 81 .002 
L Middle Temporal G -62 -26 -16 76 .001 
L Precentral G -62 6 16 71 .002 
L Middle Frontal G -32 42 -8 61 .003 
L Subcallosal G -18 12 -18 50 .005 
R Superior Frontal G 10 4 66 33 .001 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule -54 -62 40 33 .003 
L Inferior Frontal G -46 36 -12 31 .004 
R Insula 30 20 14 28 .004 
R Cingulate G 20 2 48 23 .005 
R Parahippocampa G 30 -36 -8 19 .003 
L Precentral G -60 4 36 18 .003 
R Anterior Cigulate Cortex 4 30 0 18 .01 
R Medial Frontal G 16 40 20 17 .007 
R Inferior Frontal G 60 6 36 17 .007 
R Precentral G 66 -16 40 12 .007 
      Moral-Impersonal & INT - IND 
     Positive Correlation (Interdependent) 
     R Middle Frontal G 44 38 22 13 .01 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 42 -48 48 23 .01 
      Negative Correlation (Individualistic) 
     R Corpus Callosum 4 18 6 74 .005 
L Middle Temporal G -56 -68 14 37 .001 
Bi Cingulate G -4 -2 26 362 .0001 
L Thalamus -8 -18 18 24 .006 
L Cingulate G -12 -32 42 14 .007 
62 
Bi Precuneus 0 -46 48 91 .001 
Table S4. Results of whole-brain correlational analyses between neural activity, cultural tightness, and 
self-construal score for (moral-impersonal – neutral), p < .01, k ≥ 12. MNI coordinates. 
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Condition/Region x y z Vox F 
Moral-Personal  
     Main Effects 
     Group (Korean vs. American) 
     R Putamen 30 -18 6 44 35.49 
R Postcentral G 68 -12 28 20 35.5 
R Superior Frontal G 12 56 38 20 30.24 
R Precentral G 60 4 40 16 21.43 
      Gender (Male vs. Female) 
  L Middle Frontal G -30 46 6 39 25.14 
R Hippocampus 32 -12 -24 12 24.03 
      Interaction Effect 
     Group X Dilemma Type 
     L Precentral G -26 -18 50 332 56.89 
Bi Medial Frontal G 12 2 54 102 22.99 
Bi Thalamus 2 -24 14 87 24.1 
R Subcallosal G 6 6 -16 85 30.6 
Bi Anterior Cingulate Cortex 4 36 -8 43 28.25 
R Caudate 18 16 16 42 25.54 
L Middle Frontal G -24 36 40 18 27.07 
      Moral-Impersonal  
     Main Effects 
     Group (Korean vs. American) 
     Bi Medial Frontal G* -12 56 8 64 12.31 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule* 54 -42 24 47 11.12 
L Superior Frontal G -24 16 54 34 16.4 
R Superior Parietal Lobule* 24 -66 48 20 9.283 
L Precentral G* -36 -20 52 15 11.3 
L Precentral G* -44 -20 62 12 12.45 
      Gender (Male vs. Female) 
  L Caudate -22 -10 24 94 31.49 
L Precentral G -34 -20 50 49 27.4 
R Lingual G 2 -80 -20 47 17.96 
R Fusiform G 36 -68 -20 34 19.66 
R Superior Frontal G 6 12 46 19 15.39 
      Interaction Effect 
     Group X Dilemma Type 
     L Caudate -16 22 14 228 56.16 
64 
R Anterior Cingulate 22 40 12 164 79.66 
R Substania Nigra 10 -14 -12 30 25.26 
Bi Posterior Cingulate Cortex 2 -62 8 20 26.96 
L Superior Temporal G -44 -36 4 20 17.77 
L Caudate -18 -26 26 13 22.62 
Table S5. Results of whole-brain ANOVA for the main effects of participants’ group and gender, 
and interaction effect, p < .01 familywise error corrected, k ≥ 12. MNI coordinates. (* : p < .05 
familywise error corrected, k ≥ 12) 
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Condition/Region x y z Vox t 
Moral-Personal 
     Male > Female 
     L Middle Frontal G -30 48 8 17 4.23 
      Female > Male 
     R Transverse Temporal G* 68 -10 14 44 4.35 
R Transverse Temporal G* 46 -26 12 30 3.35 
L Medial Frontal G* -6 30 -18 15 3.31 
      Moral-Impersonal 
     Male > Female 
     L Precuneus -16 -60 38 382 6.32 
R Precuneus 4 -76 46 93 4.86 
L Precuneus -14 -86 38 91 5.14 
L Middle Frontal G -34 -22 48 91 4.91 
R Insula 44 -14 -12 23 5.20 
R Fusiform G 24 -82 -22 18 4.40 
Table S6. Results of whole-brain contrast for (moral-personal – neutral), (moral-impersonal – neutral), 
(moral-personal – moral-impersonal) and (moral-impersonal – moral-personal) conditions between males 
and females, p < .001, k ≥ 12. MNI coordinates. (* : p < .005, k ≥ 12) 
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Condition/Region x y z Vox t 
Moral-Personal 
     Appropriate (Utilitarian) > Inappropriate 
     L Medial Frontal G -26 40 12 391 6.93 
R Middle Frontal G 32 44 -2 281 6.88 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule -56 -54 44 242 6.75 
R Medial Frontal G 10 -34 60 69 4.72 
L Precentral G -14 -28 68 44 4.55 
L Middle Frontal G -42 54 14 18 4.05 
      Inappropriate (Deontological) > Appropriate 
     L Superior Temporal G -48 -48 12 146 4.54 
L Middle Temporal G -56 -4 -12 120 4.49 
L Cuneus -6 -94 6 65 4.69 
R Superior Temporal G 48 20 -32 27 4.91 
R Superior Temporal G 46 -38 4 21 4.00 
L Precentral G -52 -4 50 13 4.26 
      Moral-Impersonal 
     Appropriate > Inappropriate 
     R Precuneus 24 -60 40 132 4.77 
R Middle Frontal G 48 22 24 127 4.64 
L Medial Frontal G -16 44 20 54 4.74 
L Supramarginal G -62 -48 30 41 4.37 
L Cingulate G -20 -46 38 33 5.60 
L Fusiform G -44 -46 -22 27 5.60 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 48 -42 22 12 4.15 
      Inappropriate > Appropriate 
     R Insula 46 -2 2 27 5.22 
Table S7. Results of whole-brain contrast for appropriate vs. inappropriate responses under both 
conditions, p < .001, k ≥ 12. MNI coordinates. (* : p < .005, k ≥ 12) 
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Condition/Region x y z Vox p 
Moral-Personal & Response Time 
     Positive Correlation (Slower) 
     Bi Cingulate G (Anterior + Posterior) -14 -14 26 2358 .0001 
R Inferior Frontal G 48 44 10 62 .001 
R Hippocampus 26 -36 8 33 .009 
R Inferior Frontal G 42 12 12 88 .0001 
R Cingulate G 18 -20 30 87 .002 
L Medial Frontal G -20 36 32 12 .01 
      Negative Correlation (Faster) 
     R Superior Temporal G 48 10 -22 194 .001 
R Fusiform G 52 -8 -26 16 .004 
L Middle Temporal G -56 8 -16 146 .0005 
L Inferior Temporal G -48 -38 -20 48 .001 
L Inferior Temporal G -54 -22 -18 21 .01 
L Lingual G -6 -86 -21 107 .0003 
L Fusiform G -26 -76 -10 120 .005 
L Middle Occipital G -30 -96 4 67 .006 
Bi Superior Frontal G -6 68 14 412 .0003 
L Precentral G -66 -2 16 15 .004 
L Precuneus -10 -72 24 61 .004 
R Precuneus 14 -70 26 211 .001 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 48 -50 44 27 .007 
R Inferior Frontal G 46 6 40 13 .01 
L Precentral G -56 0 44 37 .002 
L Superior Frontal G -12 50 44 20 .003 
L Superior Parietal Lobule -34 -72 50 22 .008 
L Middle Frontal G -32 -8 66 15 .008 
      Moral-Impersonal & Utilitarian Decisions 
    Positive Correlation 
     R Precuneus 20 -68 50 103 .002 
R Superior Frontal G 22 56 24 76 .006 
R Superior Frontal G 30 42 32 54 .005 
L Precuneus -20 -74 34 41 .009 
Bi Medial Frontal G 0 46 15 32 .009 
R Middle Temporal G 32 48 8 23 .009 
L Inferior Temporal G -52 -48 -18 14 .01 
      Negative Correlation 
     L Caudate -4 2 16 248 .001 
R Lentiform Nucleus 24 -4 -6 207 .0009 
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L Lentiform Nucleus -32 -2 -12 180 .001 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 44 -36 42 174 .0009 
R Inferior Frontal G 56 10 26 118 .002 
L Thalamus -28 -24 -2 117 .0006 
R Caudate 6 8 4 100 .001 
L Insula -30 -24 16 87 .002 
R Thalamus 6 -32 4 64 .004 
L Corpus Callosum -6 -30 22 48 .004 
R Insula 44 -6 -8 28 .007 
L Superior Temporal G -46 -10 -10 25 .002 
L Insula -48 -42 22 18 .003 
L Caudate -10 22 10 17 .005 
L Insula -32 16 16 16 .007 
Table S8. Results of whole-brain correlational analyses between neural activity, response time, and the 
number of utilitarian decisions for (moral-personal – neutral), p < .01, k ≥ 12. MNI coordinates. 
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Condition/Region x y z Vox p 
Moral-Impersonal & Response Time 
     Positive Correlation (Slower) 
     R Anterior Cingulate Cortex 18 44 12 157 .0001 
L Superior Temporal G -50 14 -28 98 .002 
R Caudate 2 12 8 69 .002 
L Thalamus 0 -18 6 65 .0005 
Bi Cingulate G 0 -18 46 52 .003 
R Caudate 6 10 -10 36 .002 
L Superior Frontal G -22 46 24 23 .003 
R Parahippocampa G 14 -8 -18 21 .008 
L Middle Temporal G -60 -66 10 14 .008 
L Cingulate G -10 -26 44 12 .007 
      Negative Correlation (Faster) 
     R Superior Temporal G 48 10 -22 194 .001 
R Fusiform G 52 -8 -26 16 .004 
L Middle Temporal G -56 8 -16 146 .0005 
L Inferior Temporal G -48 -38 -20 48 .001 
L Inferior Temporal G -54 -22 -18 21 .01 
L Lingual G -6 -86 -21 107 .0003 
L Fusiform G -26 -76 -10 120 .005 
L Middle Occipital G -30 -96 4 67 .006 
Bi Superior Frontal G -6 68 14 412 .0003 
L Precentral G -66 -2 16 15 .004 
L Precuneus -10 -72 24 61 .004 
R Precuneus 14 -70 26 211 .001 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 48 -50 44 27 .007 
R Inferior Frontal G 46 6 40 13 .01 
L Precentral G -56 0 44 37 .002 
L Superior Frontal G -12 50 44 20 .003 
L Superior Parietal Lobule -34 -72 50 22 .008 
L Middle Frontal G -32 -8 66 15 .008 
      Moral-Impersonal & Utilitarian Decisions 
    Positive Correlation 
     R Insula 42 -6 -10 20 .002 
R Inferior Frontal G 50 42 12 227 .006 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 54 -52 52 135 .005 
R Postcentral G 58 -26 52 38 .009 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule -54 -40 54 16 .009 
      Negative Correlation 
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L Fusiform G -38 -52 -30 143 .001 
L Hippocampus -22 -18 -6 48 .0009 
L Lingual G -4 -58 -4 37 .001 
R Cingulate G 18 20 36 16 .0009 
L Cingulate G -20 4 44 63 .002 
L Cingulate G 18 -16 52 98 .0006 
R Precuneus 24 -82 44 99 .001 
Table S9. Results of whole-brain correlational analyses between neural activity, response time, and the 
number of utilitarian decisions for (moral-impersonal – neutral), p < .01, k ≥ 12. MNI coordinates. 
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Figures 
 
Figure S1.Results of the comparison of the mean response time between Korean and American 
participants under three conditions. 
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Figure S2. Results of the comparison of the mean response time to two different responses under three 
conditions. 
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Figure S3. Results of the comparison of the mean percentages of dilemma solutions that were considered 
morally appropriate by participants between two gender groups. 
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Figure S4. Results of whole-brain contrast within Korean participants for (moral-personal – neutral), 
(moral-impersonal – neutral), (moral-personal – moral impersonal), (moral-impersonal – moral personal) 
conditions, p < .001 (uncorrected), k ≥ 12. 
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Figure S5. Results of whole-brain contrast within American participants for (moral-personal – neutral), 
(moral-impersonal – neutral), (moral-personal – moral impersonal), (moral-impersonal – moral personal) 
conditions, p < .001 (uncorrected), k ≥ 12. 
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Figure S6. Results of whole-brain correlational analyses between neural activity, cultural tightness, and 
self-construal score under for both (moral-personal – neutral) and (moral-impersonal – neutral), p < .01 
(uncorrected), k ≥ 12. 
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Figure S7. Results of whole-brain ANOVA for the main effects of nationality group and gender, 
and the interactional effect of (nationality group x dilemma type) (p < .01 (familywise error 
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corrected), k ≥ 12) under both conditions. In case of the moral-impersonal condition, for the main 
effect of participants’ nationality, a more lenient threshold was applied for exploratory purpose 
(p < .05 (familywise error corrected), k ≥ 12). 
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Figure S8. Results of whole-brain contrast for (moral-personal – neutral), (moral-impersonal – neutral), 
(moral-personal – moral-impersonal) and (moral-impersonal – moral-personal) conditions between males 
and females, p < .001, k ≥ 12. MNI coordinates. (p < .005, k ≥ 12 for moral-personal, females > males) 
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Figure S9. Results of whole-brain contrast for “appropriate” and “inappropriate” responses under two 
conditions, p < .001, k ≥ 12. MNI coordinates.   
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Figure S10. Results of whole-brain correlational analyses between neural activity, response time, and the 
number of utilitarian decisions under for both (moral-personal – neutral) and (moral-impersonal – neutral), 
p < .01 (uncorrected), k ≥ 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
